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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The principle of these cases is clear: punishment should not be
permitted for the necessary manifestations of an involuntary condition
when the individual is without substantial capacity to prevent those
manifestations. If it is unlawful to punish for a "status," it should
also be unlawful to punish the "acts" which necessarily arise as a
result of that status. This principle would seem to apply to the prin-
cipal case. If the defendant was an addict, his possession of drugs
may well have been compelled by that status. If he was without
substantial capacity to control that status or the acts which it com-
pelled, then he should not be criminally liable under the possession
statute.
6
EXPOSURE TO UNRELATED BUT INADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of burglary tools,'
and fraudulent attempt to obtain narcotics.2 With agreement of de-
fense counsel, the charges were consolidated for trial. At the close of
the state's case, the trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress
evidence relating to the burglary tools charge because it was obtained
by an illegal search, dismissed the charge of unlawful possession of
burglary tools, and instructed the jury to disregard all evidence or
inferences concerning that charge. The trial court denied defendant's
motion for a mistrial, and he was subsequently convicted of fraudulent
attempt to obtain narcotics. On appeal, a divided Washington Supreme
Court reversed and held: Notwithstanding a trial court's explicit in-
structions, exposure of a jury to evidence and exhibits relating to a
charge of possession of burglary tools is so prejudicial to a defendant
wish to make it absolutely clear that mere recidivism or narcotics addiction will not of
themselves justify acquittal under the American Law Institute standard... ." 357
F.2d at 625.
"' Such statute should be unconstitutional only if applied to the addict, and a
defendant should have the burden of showing he falls within this class. Criminal
punishment should be provided for the non-addict unlawful possessor. Such approach
would be consistent with the dictum in Robinson, which upheld the right of the
state to punish unlawful possession. In this way there would continue to be control
over the narcotics "pusher." However, this would seem to encourage narcotics push-
ers to be addicts as well, and in this way avoid criminal liability.
An indication as to how the Washington court would hold as to such an argument
might be found in State v. Collins, 50 Wn. 2d 740, 314 P.2d 660 (1957). In that case,
the court rejected the Durham rule, the irresistible-impulse doctrine, and the Ameri-
can Law Institute's substantial capacity test for criminal responsibility. The rejec-
tion was affirmed in In re White v. Rhay, 64 Wn. 2d 15, 390 P.2d 535 (1964).
1 WASH. REv. CODE § 9.19.050 (1956).
"WAsH. Ray. CODE § 69.33.380(1) (1959).
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that implications of guilt cannot be adequately struck from the minds
of jurors so as to enable defendant to receive a fair and unbiased trial
on a separate and distinct charge. State v. Suleski, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d
45,406 P.2d 613 (1965).
One of the fundamental tenets relating to jury trials is that juries
presumptively follow a trial court's instructions and consider only
evidence properly before them. If error is committed, so the theory
goes, a court can remove any prejudicial effect by simply directing the
jury to disregard the subject matter of the error when deliberating the
case. By taking notice of the practical effects of adhering to this
theory, the court in the principal case further stilled the notion that
jurors are capable of mechanically erasing from their minds all undue
or improper impressions whenever a trial court so commands. 4
In reaching its decision, the court in the principal case did not con-
cern itself with the trial court's ruling regarding search and seizure of
the evidence,' and commented only briefly on the issues of whether
defense counsel's statement that his motion for a mistrial was only for
the record amounted to a waiver of his objections6 and whether the
trial court's instructions effectively struck from the minds of the jury
the implications of the possession of burglary tools charge.7 The court
See, e.g., State v. Long, 65 Wn. ,d 303, 396 P2d 990 (1964) ; State v. Moe, 56
Wn. 2d 111, 351 P.2d 120 (1960); State v. Taylor, 47 Wn. 2d 213, 287 P.2d 298
(1955) ; State v. Weekly, 41 Wa 2d 727, 252 P.2d 246 (1952).
'Several recent cases, arising under divergent factual situations, lend credence
to the view that evidence which a jury has heard or observed, and which directly
bears on its determination, will affect the ultimate decision, regardless of the trial
court's efforts to the contrary. E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (jury
incapable of validly determining both the issue of voluntariness of a confession and
the ultimate issue of guilt); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (change of
venue should have been allowed when defendant's confession was televised prior tojury selection). Compare Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (comment on
defendant's failure to testify is a violation of fifth amendment).
'The state did not challenge this ruling. 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 49 n.2, 406 P.2d at
616 n.2. On the exclusionary rule in Washington, see State v. Riggins, 64 Wn. 2d
881, 395 P.2d 85 (1964), 40 WASH. L. REv. 369 (1965); State v. Gunkel, 188 Wash.
528, 63 P.2d 376 (1936). See generally Morris, The End of an Experiment in Fed-
eralism--a Note on Mapp v. Ohio, 36 WAsH. L. REv. 407 (1961); Comment, 36
WASH. L. REv. 501 (1961).
'The waiver contention arose out of the following statement made by defense
counsel after the trial court had dismissed the burglary tools charge:
I feel that the ruling on the part of the Court dismissing the C-850 [burglary
tools charge] probably cures any problem I had as far as mistrial is concerned
on the admission of the weapon and statements of counsel during the course of
the opening statement, however, for the record I would like to renew those
motions at this time, Your Honor. 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 50, 406 P.2d at 616.
(Emphasis added.)
The court devoted three of its instructions to directing the jury to disregard all
inferences arising from the dismissed burglary tools charge. Instruction number
sixteen, probably the most complete of these, appears at 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 56, 406
P.2d at 619:
Instruction No. 16. You are instructed that the charge of possession of burglary
1966]
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expressed the view that underlying these two issues was a more basic
point of inquiry-whether the defendant received a fair and unbiased
trial. Using this as its standard, the court decided that implications of
guilt were so securely ingrained in the jurors' minds, once improper
evidence was admitted, that the trial was inherently unfair to defen-
dant regardless of trial court efforts to avoid this effect.
Although the waiver issue was largely ignored by the majority as
being unnecessary to the decision, the dissent dealt extensively with it
to establish that defendant's counsel did, in fact, waive his motion for
mistrial and therefore lost his right to object on appeal. The general
rule is that a party is deemed to waive error when he fails to make a
timely objection' or when the objector's subsequent actions are incon-
sistent with the posture of his objection.' On the other hand, when the
alleged error is extremely flagrant, the Washington Supreme Court has
allowed its assertion on appeal even though no objection was made at
the trial.' ° "The test as to whether the failure to adequately preserve
the record is excused is whether the misconduct was so flagrant that
no instruction could cure it."" Given this propensity to ignore impli-
cations of waiver when manifest injustice would result, and to dismiss
as insignificant minor collateral references which might be construed
as waiver, the assumption that defendant's waiver in the principal case
was unimportant, if in fact it existed, seems consistent with prior
results. 2
tools has been withdrawn from your consideration. All exhibits dealing with
that charge have been stricken and are also withdrawn from your consideration.
.. You are instructed and admonished to disregard all exhibits and all informa-
tion obtained from viewing any exhibits which have been stricken. You are
further instructed and admonished to disregard all testimony concerning the
stricken exhibits, or concerning the charge which has been withdrawn, together
with any and all inferences, or insinuations from any such testimony. You shall
confine your deliberations solely to testimony and/or evidence, if any, relating
to the charge of attempting to obtain narcotics by fraud.
'In re Wilburn v. Cranor, 40 Wn. 2d 38, 240 P.2d 563, cert. denied, 343 U.S. 911(1952).
'State v. Nelson, 63 Wn. 2d 188, 386 P.2d 142 (1963) ; State v. Brubaker, 62 Wn.
2d 964, 385 P.2d 318 (1963).
"State v. Case, 49 Wn. 2d 66, 298 P.2d 500 (1956), 32 WAsH. L. Rav. 86 (1957).
"Id. at 73, 298 P.2d at 504. As to the flagrancy necessary for error to be found
uncorrectable, compare State v. Ollison, 68 Wash. Dec. 2d 50, 411 P.2d 419 (1966), a
per curiam opinion holding that refusal to grant a motion for mistrial, when defend-
ants were taken to court handcuffed prior to impaneling of a jury and prospective
veniremen may have seen them, was not error; State v. Sawyer, 60 Wn. 2d 83, 371
P.2d 932 (1962), holding that, when defendant was handcuffed following adjournment
of the first day of trial, the trial court's prompt admonition to the jury cured the
error.
"Direct authority exists for granting a new trial at the trial court level when the
judge determines "that substantial justice has not been done" in a former trial,
regardless of other rules of evidence and procedure. WASH. R. PLEAD., PPAC., PROC.
59.04W(9). The leading criminal law case construing this rule is State v. Taylor,
[VOL. 41 :517
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The position of the court in assuring an accused a fair trial, by hold-
ing as reversible error undue jury exposure to inadmissible evidence,
is commendable. From a jurisprudential viewpoint, the result of the
principal case seems desirable because it is at once consistent with
current procedural trends 3 and with previous holdings in Washington.
In virtually every case in which the court has considered the effect of
instructions on a jury, it has prefaced its remarks with a statement
that juries are presumed to follow instructions 4 though the rule is well
established that this presumption is rebutted when the error is so seri-
ous or flagrant that an instruction, no matter how framed, cannot avoid
mischief."
While this exception is consistent with prior decisions, its application
to the principal case remains somewhat unusual. By agreement of
counsel, defendant was tried simultaneously on two charges which were
completely distinct with respect to the evidence required for convic-
tion, activities engaged in by defendant, res gestae of the crimes, and
intent required. This differs greatly from the situation in which the
separate crimes alleged and tried together are related to the same
event or series of events, and introduction of improper evidence di-
rectly affects both allegations. Even so, the court reversed the convic-
tion, and its reason for this may well lie in the observation that, even
though the determination of innocence or guilt on one of the charges
should not have influenced determination on the other, under the facts
in the principal case the jury was incapable of properly applying the
evidence submitted:
The adroitly drawn picture of the defendant's criminal proclivities,
sketched upon the backdrop of the medical witness's fear of violence
and suspicion of drug addiction, literally dissolved any legalistic curtain
based upon the theory that the court's instructions could remove all
undue impressions from the jurors' minds. The defendant was irretriev-
ably prejudiced.'
Under this rationale, even if the evidence of possession of burglary
tools had been admissible, so that the jury had received both charges
60 Wn. 2d 32, 371 P.2d 617 (1962). See generally Trautman, Serving Substantial
Justicc-A Dilenma, 40 WAsH. L. Ray. 270 (1965).
" See note 4 supra.
"This rule is stated in the principal case, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 51, 406 P.2d at
617. Accord, State v. Long, 65 XTn. 2d 303, 396 P.2d 990 (1964) ; State v. Weekly,
41 Wn. 2d 727, 252 P.2d 246 (1952).
"State v. Albutt, 99 Wash. 253, 169 Pac. 584 (1917). See also State v. Case, 49
Wn. 2d 66, 298 P.2d 500 (1956) ; State v. Devlin, 145 Wash. 44, 258 Pac. 826 (1927).
" 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 51, 406 P.2d at 616.
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for determination, the court would still have had to reverse, for if
convictions were obtained on both charges there would be no way of
knowing whether the jury considered the evidence only in relation to
the proper charges.1 Since it seems unlikely that this result was in-
tended by the court, one of two conclusions may be indicated: 1) that
the presumption that juries follow instructions should have been found
controlling and the conviction affirmed, or 2) that the real error was
in combining for trial two unrelated charges arising out of different
transactions, their mere joinder being sufficiently improper to warrant
reversal. On the other hand, the court in the principal case may simply
have been rejecting the procedure employed by counsel. Prior to trial,
the defendant's attorney filed, as to each cause, a motion to suppress
the burglary tools evidence, but at the time of trial both counsel agreed,
with the trial court's consent, that these motions would be determined
"upon the basis of the evidence admitted during the trial."'" Yet the
court was adamant in its view that, once this and other evidence was
introduced, defendant was irretrievably prejudiced:
In the instant case, the bells of the dismissed burglary tools charge,
prior burglary convictions, a four or five-page F.B.I. record, a possible
violation of the Federal Firearms Act, and the fruits of the various
searches, were so conclusively rung as to effectively preclude their "un-
ringing."'19
This view may indicate that, unless evidence alleged to have been
obtained unlawfully is subsequently found admissible, its presentation
within the jury's hearing will be grounds for a mistrial. If this be true,
it follows that, in the interest of avoiding multiplicity of litigation as
well as protecting an accused's rights, all of the parties to a criminal
action will wish to determine the admissibility of evidence, alleged to
have been illegally obtained, out of the jury's presence.
'
7Notice that this difficulty cannot occur when only one crime is alleged, or when
separate crimes alleged and tried together are related to the same event or series of
events, since the introduction of improper evidence would have a prejudicial effect
on each charge.
1867 Wash. Dec. 2d at 48, 406 P.2d at 615.
Id. at 51, 406 P.2d at 616. From the beginning of the opinion, the court indicates
its distaste for the methods employed by the trial court and respective counsel to deter-
mine the admissibility of evidence in the principal case: "This case strikingly illus-
trates the incongruity of undertaling to test the legality of a search and the admissi-
bility of seized evidence in the presence of a jury." Id. at 46, 406 P.2d at 613.
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